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Background: In The Netherlands, efforts to control meticillin-resistant Staphylococcus
aureus (MRSA) in hospitals have been largely successful due to stringent screening of
patients on admission and isolation of those that fall into defined risk categories. However,
Dutch hospitals are not free of MRSA, and a considerable number of cases are found that
do not belong to any of the risk categories. Some of these may be due to undetected
nosocomial transmission, whereas others may be introduced from unknown reservoirs.
Aim: Identifying multi-institutional clusters of MRSA isolates to estimate the contribution
of potential unobserved reservoirs in The Netherlands.
Methods: We applied a clustering algorithm that combines time, place, and genetics to
routine data available for all MRSA isolates submitted to the Dutch Staphylococcal
Reference Laboratory between 2008 and 2011 in order to map the geo-temporal distri-
bution of MRSA clonal lineages in The Netherlands.
Findings: Of the 2966 isolates lacking obvious risk factors, 579 were part of geo-temporal
clusters, whereas 2387 were classified as MRSA of unknown origin (MUOs). We also
observed marked differences in the proportion of isolates that belonged to geo-temporal
clusters between specific multi-locus variable number of tandem repeat analysis (MLVA)
clonal complexes, indicating lineage-specific transmissibility. The majority of clustered
isolates (74%) were present in multi-institutional clusters.
Conclusion: The frequency of MRSA of unknown origin among patients lacking obvious risk
factors is an indication of a largely undefined extra-institutional but genetically highly
diverse reservoir. Efforts to understand the emergence and spread of high-risk clones
require the pooling of routine epidemiological information and typing data into central
databases.
ª 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd
on behalf of The Healthcare Infection Society. This is an open access article
under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).Medical Center Groningen, Department of Medical Microbiology, HPC EB80, Postbus 30.001, 9700 RB
15169.
.uk (T. Donker).
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T. Donker et al. / Journal of Hospital Infection 93 (2016) 366e374 367Introduction questions about the anatomical site of isolation, demographics
of the patient, the reason for sampling, and whether the pa-Occurrence of meticillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus
(MRSA) in hospitals differs markedly between countries.1 The
low MRSA rates in The Netherlands have conventionally been
attributed to the so-called Dutch search-and-destroy policy,
which stipulates that all patients who have had MRSA in the
past or who are regarded at high risk of being colonized or
infected are screened on admission and treated in strict
isolation until screening results become available.2,3 Despite
these efforts, hospitals in The Netherlands are not free of
MRSA. Time and again, MRSA is isolated from hospitalized pa-
tients without obvious risk factors after being admitted for
more than two days. This leads to extensive screening of con-
tact patients and possibly even hospital staff, which can be
rather disruptive.
Patients with these unexpected MRSA findings pose an
epidemiological and public health challenge. They either
represent cases of primary introduction, which are regarded as
MRSA of unknown origin (MUO), or are the result of unobserved
secondary spread.4 The first would be suggestive of a tip of the
iceberg whereby the frequency with which MUOs are isolated in
hospitals would be a reflection of an undetermined extra-
institutional reservoir, the second an indication of hidden
intra- or inter-institutional transmission chains.
Conventional hospital-based investigational epidemiology
has its limitations as it can only link cases with an apparent
epidemiological association, for instance if patients had shared
a room. Conversely, data available at national public health
institutes or reference laboratories contain too little informa-
tion to identify these obvious epidemiological links. However,
molecular typing data, and information about the location and
time of isolation, may provide sufficient detail to address some
of the above-mentioned challenges.
By combining data available at the Dutch staphylococcal
reference laboratory at the National Institute for Public Health
and the Environment (RIVM) we map the distribution of multi-
locus variable number of tandem repeat analysis (MLVA)
types over time and space and estimate the size and clonal
composition of institutional and multi-institutional MRSA clus-
ters. We also determine the number and genetic diversity of
MUOs as an estimate of the frequency of primary hospital in-
troductions by patients without the obvious risk factors of MRSA
carriage. Using the results of these analyses, we draw conclu-
sions about the existence of unknown reservoirs outside of
hospitals and the differential transmissibility of MRSA clones
within healthcare settings.Methods
Data and algorithm
MRSA surveillance
Primary MRSA isolates from patients admitted to Dutch
hospitals are routinely sent to the RIVM by all microbiological
laboratories in The Netherlands for reference typing. Each
isolate is investigated by MLVA, staphylococcal protein A (spa)
typing and mecA and lukS lukF polymerase chain reaction (PCR)
as part of the standard reference service.5 The hospitals are
asked to complete a questionnaire about epidemiological
metadata for each isolate. This questionnaire includestient belonged to one of the risk groups defined by the Work-
group Infection Prevention.3 We used data collected between
2008 and 2011 (four years), and included only the isolates for
which information for the following variables was available:
date of isolation, MLVA type, postal code of patients’ resi-
dence, and submitting laboratory. Duplicate isolates from the
same patient, same laboratory, and same year were excluded.
Typing data partitioned at the level of MLVA clonal complex
(MC) were used; these essentially overlap with MLST clonal
complexes with the same number.5 Because of the large
number of isolates belonging to MC398, and because the algo-
rithm is computationally intensive, we only used data from
2009 for the MC398 clonal complex.
Cluster algorithm
To identify clusters of isolates in the MRSA surveillance
database, a non-parametric clustering algorithm proposed by
Ypma et al. was used. In short, this algorithm counts the
number of isolates between any two samples for each of the
available variables, to calculate the combined distance be-
tween them.6 The isolates are then joined to form a ‘trans-
mission tree’ of related isolates, based on the calculated
distances. Starting with the entire transmission tree as one
possible cluster, the weakest link in this cluster, i.e. the link
with the longest distance between two isolates, is recorded
together with the size of the cluster. The cluster is subse-
quently split up by this weakest link, resulting in two new
possible clusters, two single isolates, or one single isolate and
one possible cluster. This splitting is repeated on each possible
cluster until all links are removed and only single isolates are
left, at which point (N ‒ 1) possible clusters are recorded
together with their weakest link, where N is the number of
isolates. After all combinations of cluster size and the strength
of the weakest link in the cluster are recorded, they are tested
against 1000 randomly generated transmission trees to assess
whether its weakest link was stronger than would be expected
for a cluster of the same size under random assumption.
Permutation test
A permutation test was performed to assess whether the
weakest link in each observed cluster was stronger than could
be expected if all isolates were epidemiologically unrelated (in
which case they should be randomly distributed over the vari-
ables). For each of the variables, a random order of isolates
was chosen, thus creating random combinations of time,
location, and genetics per isolate. For each permuted dataset,
the cluster algorithm was performed as described above,
keeping track of all weakest links for each possible cluster size.
The strongest of these weakest links is as close as isolates are
expected to be at random, depending on the size of cluster
they are in, and is recorded. This process was repeated on 1000
permutation datasets. The resulting distribution of link
strengths for each cluster size was then used to test the
observed cluster size‒weakest link combinations.
Distance measures
For each of the variables, a distance metric needs to be
defined. For the date of isolation this is simply the difference in
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Figure 1. Isolates included in the study. Of the 14,042 isolates submitted to the Dutch National Institute for Public Health and the
Environment, 5090 isolates were excluded (2864 duplicates and 2226 lacking information). A further 2657 MC398 isolates were excluded
to reduce computational time, yielding a total of 6295 isolates used in the integrated algorithm.
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distance between the centroids of the postal code areas. For
theMLVA data, the number of VNTR loci difference between the
isolates was used (range: 0e8). For the distance measure be-
tween laboratories, we used the referral distance between the
main hospitals they serve. This is the shortest path between two
hospitals through the national patient referral network, formed
by the exchange of patients between hospitals. The shortest
paths between all hospitals were determined using a simulated
patient referral network (see Supplementary data).7
Epidemiological validation
The cluster algorithm was applied using the following vari-
ables: isolation date, postal code of patients’ residence, andMLVA type. In a subsequent analysis, postal code of patients’
residence was replaced by position of healthcare institution
within the Dutch referral network. For each MLVA clonal com-
plex,we recorded thenumberof isolates that formgeo-temporal
clusters, the total number of clusters, and the number of clusters
that included isolates from more than one hospital.
In order to test the robustness of the algorithm, we assessed
the influence of spurious connections on the clustering by
repeatingtheanalysisonrandomlychosensubsetsofthedata.We
selected 90% of the isolates and repeated the cluster algorithm
and permutation test. This jack-knife process was repeated 1000
times. The distribution of the percentage clustered isolates was
compared with the observed point-estimate, using the entire
dataset. We also performed the algorithm on the isolates sub-
divided per year for the MLVA complexes that contained >100
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Figure 2. Data sources for cluster detection in meticillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus isolates in The Netherlands 2008 to 2010, MLVA
(multi-locus variable number of tandem repeat analysis) complex 8. (A) The postal code of the patients’ home addresses, (B) the MLVA
complex, here shown as a minimum spanning tree, with each circle showing a single MLVA type (size increasing with number of isolates),
and (C) time at which the sample was isolated, here shown in weekly aggregate numbers. Light grey denotes isolates outside clusters; blue,
red, green, and black show the isolates present in the four largest clusters. The other clustered isolates are shown in dark grey. Whereas
each of the sources shows weak clustering pattern, the three sources, taken together, reveal considerably stronger clustering pattern.
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fluence of using data collected over shorter time-frames.
Certain risk categories defined by the Dutch Working Group
for Infection Prevention (WIP) such as patients who had been in
contact with a known MRSA carrier are more likely associated
with nosocomial transmission, and therefore isolates from
these patients are more likely to form clusters.3 Conversely, if
patients were screened because they had previously been
hospitalized outside The Netherlands, the isolates may be
regarded as introductions, and not likely to form a cluster.
Isolates that had multiple conflicting WIP categories attached
or that were recorded as isolates without accompanying WIP
categories were marked as conflicting cases. We further
measured the proportion of clustered isolates for isolates
without apparent risk factors: since no epidemiological infor-
mation was submitted or no known risk factors were identified,no expectation could be formulated. We compared the odds of
an isolate belonging to a cluster, stratified by WIP risk category,
to test whether the results coincided with the expectations
based on their epidemiological profile. Next to the provided
epidemiological information, we assessed whether isolates
that carried the Panton‒Valentine Leukocidin (PVL) gene,
which is associated with community acquisition of MRSA, were
more often found in isolates that did not cluster.Results
MRSA surveillance
Between 2008 and 2011, a total of 14,042 MRSA isolates
were submitted to the RIVM for reference confirmation and
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Figure 3. The proportion of isolates that is part of a cluster according to the algorithm. Dots show the point estimate; box plots (median,
interquartile range, 95% interval) include jack-knife estimates for 90% of the isolates. Frequently occurring hospital-associated meticillin-
resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) strains (MC5, MC45, MC22) show higher proportions of clustering than community (MC8)- or
livestock (MC398)-associated MRSA.
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information about the patient’s place of residence and were
excluded from the analysis. Molecular typing grouped 7720
(86%) isolates into five dominant MLVA clonal complexes (MC,
Figure 1; Supplementary Table I). The remaining 1232 isolates
belonged to an additional 11 MCs. MC398 contained most iso-
lates (3852, 43%), coinciding with sequence type (ST)398 which
represents livestock-associated MRSA in The Netherlands.8
Since the integrated cluster algorithm scales exponentially
with the number of isolates, inclusion of all MC398 isolates
became computationally too intensive and only MC398 isolates
for 2009 were included in the current study, yielding a total of
6295 isolates.
Clusters
Based on a novel algorithm that integrates time, place, and
genetic distance, 1724 isolates (27%) formed 155 significant
clusters that were unlikely to have occurred by chance(Supplementary Table II; MC8 shown as example in Figure 2).
Sixty-eight clusters (44%) included isolates that originated from
more than one laboratory, and consequently also from more
than one healthcare institution; 76% (1315/1724) of all clus-
tered isolates were part of multi-institutional clusters. The
largest cluster included 167 MC8 isolates from 21 different
laboratories over 31 months. The proportion of isolates that
formed clusters differed considerably between different MLVA
clonal complexes. Only 4.4% (52/1195) of the MC398 isolates
were part of a cluster in contrast to 47% (285/611) in MC45
(Figure 3). The dominant community- and animal-associated
MLVA complexes (i.e. MC8 and MC398) showed lower pro-
portions of clustered isolates than MLVA complexes typically
associated with HA-MRSA. The jack-knife analysis did not result
in large differences in proportions of clustered isolates for the
dominant MLVA clonal complexes (Figure 3). The algorithm thus
seems to be robust against missing data, which might arise in
the surveillance system or through exclusion in our analysis.
Furthermore, the proportion of clustered isolates did not
OR
10.30.1 3 10
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Admitted from hospital abroad
Adopted child abroad
Regular visits to hospital abroad
Known MRSA carrier
Admission from hospital with known MRSA problem
Shared room with MRSA carrier
Community-acquired (finding <48h after risk admission)
Lacking obvious risk factors
Contact tracing
HCW unprotected contact with MRSA carrier*
Figure 4. The odds of belonging to a cluster of isolates differ considerably between epidemiological risk categories. The results of the
clustering algorithm overlap with expectations based on risk group. The isolates lacking obvious risk factors more often fall outside the
clusters, whereas isolates obtained as part of contact tracing during outbreaks were more often found within clusters. This is a healthcare
worker (HCW)-specific risk group. OR, odds ratio; MRSA, meticillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus.
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(Supplementary Figure 1), although the confidence bounds
increased due to the smaller sample size per MLVA complex/
time-frame. The proportion of clustered isolates for MC398
was lower than for any of the other major MLVA complexes.
Isolates lacking risk factors
Of the 6295 isolates, 2966 (47%) lack obvious risk factors
based on the epidemiological data. These consisted of 1405
isolates marked as unexpected findings, from patients without
known risk factors, and 1561 clinical isolates submitted directly
from laboratories unaccompanied by epidemiological infor-
mation collected by infection control nurses. Of all these iso-
lates, 579 (19.5%) were part of a cluster, and the proportion of
clustered isolates did not differ between the unexpected
findings (276/1405, 19.6%) and isolates without epidemiolog-
ical information (303/1561, 19.4%). We could therefore not
establish any epidemiological association for the remaining
2387 isolates lacking obvious risk factors; these thus represent
true MUOs and made up 38% of all submitted isolates.
Epidemiological validation
For 1757 (28%) isolates, epidemiological metadata including
the patient’s WIP risk categories were known. The most
frequent risk category was ‘contact with farm animals’, which
coincided with the isolation of an MC398 strain. Among the
other MCs the most frequent risk categories were ‘admission
from a foreign hospital’ and ‘admitted to hospital with known
MRSA problem’ (Supplementary Table II). The results from the
cluster analysis were largely supported by this additional in-
formation. Isolates from patients who were admitted after
hospitalization abroad were preferentially found outside clus-
ters [odds ratio (OR): 0.22; 95% confidence interval: 0.15e0.31]
(Figure 4), with only 8% (31/389) clustered, whereas isolates
from patients who shared a room with known MRSA carriers
were mainly found within clusters (7.35; 5.09e10.6). Moreover,most isolates (59%, 491/836) identified as part of contact
screening were part of a cluster (Supplementary Table II).
Isolates assigned as community-acquired MRSA, found
within 48 h after admission, were mostly without obvious risk
factors (83%, 489/592), and a small proportion of these CA-
MRSA isolates clustered (20%, 119/592). Isolates containing
the PVL gene, widely associated with community acquisition
and mainly representing findings without apparent risk factors
in our sample (68%, 868/1271), only clustered occasionally
(Figure 5).9e11 MC8 harboured the largest proportion (41%, 515/
1271) of the PVL-positive isolates. Among clustered MC8 iso-
lates, only 12% (43/356) were PVL positive versus 50% (472/936)
of those that did not cluster (P < 0.0001).
Healthcare network position
When using the position of the healthcare institutions within
the national patient referral network instead of postal code of
patients’ residence, we identified 1420 isolates (23%)
(Supplementary Table III) forming 142 clusters, whereby 47
clusters were multi-institutional. Clusters in this analysis
largely overlapped with that using patients’ postal code, i.e.
1120 isolates clustered in both analyses, and the proportions of
clustered isolates per MLVA clonal complex show a similar
pattern in both analyses (Supplementary Figure 2). Of the 2966
isolates without apparent risk factors, 467 (16%) were identi-
fied as part of a cluster using this analysis.
Discussion
Stringent screening policies are implemented in The
Netherlands for patients who belong to risk categories. These
risk categories identify many MRSA carriers on admission to
Dutch hospitals, preventing further nosocomial spread and
limiting the number of hospital-acquired MRSA cases. However,
a considerable number of MRSA isolates submitted to the RIVM
are isolated from patients who do not belong to any of the risk
categories, marked as unexpected findings, or were submitted
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Figure 5. The proportion of isolates positive for PantoneValentine Leukocidin (PVL) and the proportion of community-acquired (CA)
isolates are higher among cases outside the clusters. Black bars show clustered isolates; grey bars show non-clustered isolates. (A) The
proportion of PVL-positive cases for the largest MLVA (multi-locus variable number of tandem repeat analysis) clonal complexes (MCs),
and (B) for isolates obtained as part of contact tracing during outbreaks, those isolated within 48 h after admission (CA), and without
apparent risk factors. (C) In absolute number of isolates, most PVL-positive isolates are found among isolates without apparent risk
factors outside clusters. (D) The proportion of CA meticillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) for the largest MCs, and (E) for
isolates obtained as part of contact tracing during outbreaks and isolates without apparent risk factors. (F) In absolute number of isolates,
most CA-MRSA isolates are found outside clusters.
T. Donker et al. / Journal of Hospital Infection 93 (2016) 366e374372to the reference laboratory without accompanying epidemio-
logical information. Some of these isolates are the result of
unobserved transmission whereas others were introduced from
hitherto undefined reservoirs. Isolates of the last group may be
regarded as MUOs.4Using an integrated clustering algorithm, we mapped the
distribution of MLVA types over time and space across the
entire Dutch healthcare system, and thus determined the size
and clonal composition of clusters of related isolates.6
Although the algorithm cannot distinguish between
T. Donker et al. / Journal of Hospital Infection 93 (2016) 366e374 373transmission chains inside and outside the hospital, it is far
more likely to detect hospital transmission, because isolates
were collected in healthcare institutions. Potential trans-
mission chains in the community will inevitably be diluted due
to the lower sampling density. This allowed us to infer the
proportion of isolates belonging to any specific lineage that is
typically associated with intra- and inter-hospital transmission,
and to determine the number and genetic diversity of MUOs as
an estimate of the frequency of primary introductions and the
size of extramural reservoirs.
The algorithm assigned 579 of the 2966 (19.5%) unexpected
isolates and isolates without epidemiological information to
clusters, indicating a close epidemiological association, prob-
ably attributable to transmission. This finding suggests that
local hospital epidemiologists are unable to identify all noso-
comial transmission events, especially if transmission chains
extend over different healthcare institutions. The remainder of
these isolates, which represented almost 40% of all included
submissions, showed no epidemiological associations and rep-
resented true MUOs. Their exact reservoir remains elusive,
although the high proportion of PVL-positive isolates among the
MUOs in MLVA clonal complex 8 (MC8) suggests a community
origin.9e11 Intriguingly, more of the isolates were assigned to
clusters when patients’ residential postal codes were used as a
proxy for location rather than the position within the national
referral network of the patient’s healthcare institution. This
may be an indication of community transmission and suggests
that MUOs recovered from admitted patients indeed represent
a sample of MRSA co-circulating among non-hospitalized in-
dividuals in Dutch communities.
The shortcomings in the epidemiological data reflect how
conventional epidemiological methods rely heavily on data
collected on-site by infection control staff. Although the data
collection for a single case may appear rather manageable, the
cumulative effort for all cases becomes daunting due to the
current constraints on human personnel and economic re-
sources in healthcare institutions. This reduces the sensitivity
of local investigational epidemiology because cases will be
missed and direct links disappear. The autonomous nature of
the clustering algorithm is therefore one of its key advantages.
The algorithm only requires the most basic information ‒ time,
place, and genomic profile ‒ and may suggest epidemiological
associations in an automatic manner.
We tested the results for epidemiological consistency using
the available metadata for a subset of isolates and found a high
correlation between the WIP risk groups and the degree of
clustering as suggested by the algorithm. Isolates that were
generally considered to be introduced by patients after a
period of hospitalization abroad were unlikely to form clusters
(OR: 0.22), whereas isolates obtained as part of contact tracing
during outbreaks were more often found within clusters (OR:
4.38). However, the sensitivity of clustering algorithms always
depends on the sampling density. If fewer isolates are
collected, it will become harder for the algorithm to distinguish
outbreaks from the independent introductions, because fewer
isolates from the outbreak will be available. This would mainly
apply to short transmission chains; larger events will still be
detected, because the chance of finding two related cases in-
creases with the number of cases in the chain.7 It is therefore
possible that some of the isolates assigned as independent in-
troductions were still part of small, but largely unobserved,
transmissions which have been missed.We used an algorithm designed to find clusters of infectious
disease transmission, as it focuses on chains of cases rather
than cases that cluster around a common point (Kulldorff
SaTScan 2005) in time, space, or genetics.6 Because it uses an
ordinal distance for each variable, counting the number of
isolates between two isolates in question, it does not need to
make assumptions on how distances in different variables need
to be combined. The algorithm thus tries to find clusters of
cases without prior knowledge of the structure of the data.
Consequently, some of the links within a cluster may be weak if
two of the three epidemiological parameters (location, time,
and genetic distance) suggest a close association. For instance,
a cluster may include isolates based on spatial and temporal
proximity that for evolutionary reasons would be deemed less
likely. This is possible in larger clusters, because the algorithm
will then allow for weaker links to be included in the cluster,
resulting in a slight overestimation of the cluster size or joining
of multiple ‘true’ clusters. Due to these potential shortcomings
in specificity we expect that the 38% MRSA of unknown origin
among all incident MRSA cases in Dutch healthcare institutions
between 2008 and 2011 is a conservative estimate.
Using a cluster algorithm to identify clusters of related
isolates delivers novel insights in the dynamics of MRSA at na-
tional level that can aid the design of novel intervention
strategies and guidelines. First, many of the clusters connect
multiple healthcare institutions, which would have remained
undetected if the isolates were typed only locally and isolates
were not made available to reference laboratories. These
multi-institutional clusters are likely caused by referred MRSA-
positive patients between hospitals.7,12,13 It shows how the
occurrence of nosocomial pathogens in hospitals should not be
viewed as events in single, independent units. Any intervention
strategy or surveillance system adds value if it is organized at
regional or national level.
Second, the proportion of clustered isolates reflects the
propensity of a clone to spread through the hospital popula-
tion, as nosocomial transmission will result in clustered iso-
lates. The isolates belonging to MC398, representing ST398,
show very few clusters. These livestock-associated MRSA iso-
lates are considered to spread easily within and between ani-
mal herds, but apparently they only spread through the human
population on a very limited scale.14e16 Most of the MC398
isolates would therefore be the result of independent in-
troductions presumably from the animal reservoir. This same
pattern is seen in MRSA strains associated with community
acquisition. Novel intervention strategies will require rapid
identification at clonal level to take the differential trans-
missibility into account and inform infection control measures
on the basis of epidemic potential of individual clonal lineages
of MRSA.
The results also hold implications for the current guidelines
in The Netherlands. The search-and-destroy policy is able to
prevent a significant part of the MRSA transmission in Dutch
hospitals by identifying patients at risk. Thus, the policy con-
tributes to the low MRSA prevalence in the Dutch hospitals, and
it should therefore be maintained. However, this will become
an increasingly difficult task, as we expect the number of MUOs
to rise. The suggested community reservoir of these MUOs calls
for a more detailed risk analysis to improve the WIP categories
and maintain the low MRSA prevalence in Dutch hospitals.
The implications reach further than the borders of The
Netherlands, and show that a national perspective is
T. Donker et al. / Journal of Hospital Infection 93 (2016) 366e374374imperative to understand the dispersal of high risk micro-
organisms, such as ‒ but not exclusively ‒ MRSA. Information
on the epidemiological and genetic background of cases needs
to be collected in central databases, because the dispersal of
these clones takes place beyond single healthcare institutions.
Making individual hospitals responsible for the reporting of
outbreaks will not yield the information needed to correctly
inform control policy.
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